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COMMENTS
THE NEW COMMERCIAL SPEECH AND THE FAIR CREDIT
REPORTING ACT
In 1970, Congress enacted the first significant regulation of the
2
credit reporting industry," the Fair Credit Reporting Act (FCRA),
and the scholarly community responded promptly with analysis and
commentary.8 The FCRA's potential violation of the first amend4
ment, however, received little attention.
In September 1980, in Equifax Services, Inc. v. Cohen,5 the

Supreme Judicial Court of Maine invalidated several sections of the
I See A Bill to Enable Consumers to Protect Themselves Against Arbitrary, Erroneous, and Malicious Credit Information: Hearings on S. 823 Before the Subcomm. on Financial Institutions of the Senate Comm. on Banking and Currency,
91st Cong., 1st Sess. 2 (1969) (statement of Senator Proxmire) [hereinafter cited
as Hearings on S. 823].
2
Fair Credit Reporting Act (FCRA), Pub. L. No. 91-508, §§ 601-622, 84
Stat. 1114, 1127 (1970) (current version at 15 U.S.C. §§ 1681-1681t (1976 &
Supp. 1I 1979)).
8
See, e.g., Note, Protecting Privacy in Credit Reporting, 24 STrN. L. REV.
550 (1972) [hereinafter cited as STAN. Note]; Note, Protecting the Subjects of
Credit Reports, 80 YALE L.J. 1035 (1971) [hereinafter cited as YAL= Note].
4 See A Bill to Enable Consumers to Protect Themselves Against Arbitrary,
Erroneous, and Malicious Credit Information: Hearings on H.R. 16340 Before the
Subcomm. on Consumer Affairs of the House Comm. on Banking and Currency,
91st Cong., 2d Sess. 236 (1970) (statement of Lawrence Speiser, -Director, Washington Office, American Civil Liberties Union).
Mrs. Sullivan. Now some have argued that placing any restriction
on the collection and dissemination of credit or personal data would be
in violation of the constitutional right of free speech, and we would like
to have your response to that.
Mr. Speiser. I think that is a frivolous claim. There are all kinds of
restrictions placed on commercial enterprises in this country as to what
they can say.
,The Securities and Exchange Commission, I think, is a good'example
where they require rather elaborate notifications about the conditions under which securities are now being sold, and very strict controls" as to
what they can say and how they can say it. These rules do not violate
the first amendment.
Similarly, as far back as 1942, the Supreme Court held n 'Valentine
v. Christensen, [sic] 316 U.S. 52 (1942), that commercial advertising, for
example, was not protected by the first amendment.
Id. Mr. Speiser's statement illustrates the extent to which first amendment
violations were not an issue.
See generally Hood v. Dun & Bradstreet, Inc., 486 F.2d 25 (5th Cir. 1973),
cert. denied, 415 U.S. 985 (1974); Grove v. Dun & Bradstreet, Inc., 438 F.2d
433 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 898 (1971); Wortham v. Dun & Bradstreet,
Inc., 399 F. Supp. 633 (S.D. Tex. 1975), aff'd, 537 F.2d 1142 (5th Cir. 1976).
By 1976, however, the issue was drawing more attention. See Millstone v. O'HanIon Reports, Inc., 528 F.2d 829 (8th Cir. 1976).
5420 A.2d 189 (Me. 1980), cert. denied, 101 S. Ct. 1360 (1981).
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Maine Fair Credit Reporting Act (Maine Act),6 holding that they
violated the first amendment of the U.S. Constitution. During the
period between the enactment of the FCRA and the invalidation
of the Maine Act, the U.S. Supreme Court decided several casesredefining commercial speech and enlarging the first amendment
protection afforded such speech.7 In its analysis in Equifax, the
court discussed a number of these cases. 8 Because the Maine Act
was patterned after the FCRA, the Maine Court's finding raises
serious questions about the constitutionality of similar provisions of
the FCRA, which impose numerous restrictions and requirements
on the speech of credit bureaus in the preparation of consumer
credit reports. Requirements include disclosures to the consumer,
procedures for ensuring the accuracy of the information reported,
and limitations on the information that may be included and on
the "users" who may receive reports. 9
IsM
Ev. STAT. ANN. tit 10, §§ 1311-1328 (1980)
(Maine Act). The
FCRA provides that states may enforce their own consumer reporting legislation
to the extent that it is consistent with federal law. 15 U.S.C. § 1681t (1976). In
Equifax, the court invalidated, on federal constitutional grounds, two sections of

the Maine Act that went beyond the FCRA in regulating consumer reporting.
In its analysis, the court used the test enunciated in Central Hudson Gas & Elec.
Corp. v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 447 U.S. 557 (1980), discussed infra at text accompanying notes 35-38.
First, the court invalidated the sections of the statute forbidding a consumer
reporting agency to use, report, or retain in its files "information which it has
reason to believe is . . . not relevant to the purpose for which it is sought." ME.
REv. STAT. ANN. tit. 10, §§1314(2), 1314(3) (1980).
See 420 A.2d at 208.

The court declared that these provisions could "infringe upon constitutionally protected commercial speech, since the 'irrelevance' of information does not inevitably,
or with strong likelihood, cause it to be deceptive or misleading." 420 A.2d at
203. The FCRA contains no equivalent restriction.
The court also found unconstitutional § 1314(1) of the Maine Act, which forbade preparation or procurement of an investigative consumer report without the
subject's consent, because it did not further a substantial governmental interest.
Even if it was related to such an interest, however, it did not "directly advance"
the interest and was "more extensive than . . . necessary to serve it." 420 A!2d
at 200. Although the FCRA requires that subjects of investigative consumer reports
be notified of their preparation, it does not require consumers' consent. See 15
U.S.C. § 1681d (1976).
Third, the Maine court struck down the provision prohibiting consumer reports from containing specific items of dated information-for example, bankruptcies older than fourteen years or arrest records older than seven years. M. REv.
STAT. ANN. tit. 10, § 1321(4)(A) (1980).
The court found that this subsection
intruded on "constitutionally protected commercial speech" more extensively than
necessary to serve the governmental interest. 420 A.2d at 206. As the court
noted, §1321(4)(A) was substantively similar to 15 U.S.C. §1681c, the provision of the FCRA that prohibits the reporting of "obsolete information." 420
A.2d at 206. The Maine court did not purport to pass judgment on any provision
of the FCRA; 15 U.S.C. §§ 1681c and 1681d, therefore, are still in effect in Maine,
despite the invalidation of similar state statutory provisions on federal constitutional7 grounds.
See infra text accompanying notes 17-38.
8 420 U.S. at 195-209.

9 See infra text accompanying notes 78-93.
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The first amendment questions raised by Equifax suggest possible constitutional challenges not only to the FCRA but also to the
consumer credit reporting regulations of a number of states. In
addition to Maine, thirteen states I have enacted laws regulating
consumer credit reporting. Ten of these states have restricted the
content of consumer credit reports."1
This Comment examines the FCRA in light of the new protected status of commercial speech. Part I sets forth the history of
the treatment of commercial speech. Part II discusses the appropriateness of classifying consumer reports as commercial speech.
After identifying in part III the questionable sections of the FCRA,
the Comment in part IV applies the Supreme Court's latest test for
commercial speech, articulated in Central Hudson Gas & Electric
Corp. v. Public Service Commission,12 to the vulnerable sections of
the FCRA.
I. HISTORY OF THE COMMERCIAL SPEECH DOCTRINE

The Supreme Court first addressed the issue of first amendment
protection for commercial speech in 1942. The question before the
Court in that case, Valentine v. Chrestensen,1s was whether the city
of New York could restrain the distribution of advertising handbills
1OPetition for a Writ of Certiorari to the Supreme Judicial Court of the
State of Maine at 15, Equifax Services, Inc. v. Cohen, 420 A.2d 189 (Me. 1980),
cert. denied, 101 S. Ct. 1360 (1981). The states are: Arizona, Amaz. REV. STAT.
ANN. §§44-1691 to -1696 (West Supp. 1980); California, CAL. Cxv. CODE
§§ 1785.1 to 1786.56 (West Supp. 1981); Connecticut, CoNN. GEN. STAT. ANN.
§§ 36-431 to -435 (West 1981); Kansas, KAN. STAT. ANN. §§ 50-701 to -722

(1976); Kentucky, KY. REv. STAT. §367.310 (Supp. 1980); Maryland, Mn. Com.
LAw CoDE ANN. §§ 14-1201 to -1218 (Michie Supp. 1980); Massachusetts,
MAss. ANN. LAws ch. 93, 0§50-68 (Michie/Law Co-op 1975 & Supp. 1981);

Montana, MoNT. CODEs ANN. §§ 31-3-101 to -153 (1979); Nevada, Nsv. REv.
STAT. § 598B.130 (1975); New Hampshire, N.H. REv. STAT. ANN. §§ 359-B:1 to :21
(Supp. 1979); New Mexico, N.M. STAT. ANN. §§ 56-3-1 to -8 (1978); New York,
N.Y. GL;N. Bus. LAw §§ 380 to 380-s (McKinney Supp. 1980); Oklahoma, OszLA.
STAT. AmNr. tit. 24, §§ 81-85 (West 1951).

"1 Petition For A Writ of Certiorari To the Supreme Judicial Court of the
State of Maine at 15, Equifax Services, Inc. v. Cohen, 420 A.2d 189 (Me. 1980),
cert. denied, 101 S. Ct. 1360 (1981).
Equifax may have implications for other areas of economic regulation as well.

See Jackson & Jeffries, Commercial Speech: Economic Due Process and the First
Amendment, 65 VA. L. BEv. 1, 3 (1979). Requirements of corrective advertising,
see, e.g., Warner-Lambert Co. v. FTC, 562 F.2d 749 (D.C. Cir. 1977), cert. denied,
435 U.S. 950 (1978); Beneficial Corp. v. FTC, 542 F.2d 611 (3d Cir. 1976), or
warnings, 15 U.S.C. § 1333 (1976) (health warnings on cigarette packages), as
well as statutes that prohibit the broadcast of cigarette commercials, 15 U.S.C. § 1335
(1976), all may be vulnerable to first amendment attack under the current treatment
of commercial speech.
22447 U.S. 557 (1980). See infra text accompanying notes 35-38.
1 316 U.S. 52 (1942).
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as a violation of its sanitary code. The Court's unanimous decision
declared that commercial speech warranted no protection. Cities
could not interfere unduly with use of the streets to distribute information. The Court found it "equally clear," however, that "the
Constitution imposes no such restraints on government as respects
purely commercial advertising."1 4
The issue of first amendment protection for commercial speech
remained well-settled for two decades. The first seeds of change
were sown in New York Times Co. v. Sullivan. 5 Although the
Court did not extend first amendment protection to "purely" commercial speech, it did distinguish between noncommercial speech
used in a commercial context and commercial speech used in a
commercial context. An advertisement in the New York Times,
describing events that occurred during a civil rights demonstration
in Montgomery, Alabama, resulted in a libel suit against the Times.
The Court, in determining the appropriate level of protection for
politically motivated advertising containing arguably libelous statements, carefully distinguished it from purely commercial speech:
The publication here was not a "commercial" advertisement in the sense in which the word was used in
Chrestensen. It communicated information, expressed
opinion, recited grievances, protested claimed abuses, and
sought financial support on behalf of a movement whose
existence and objectives are matters of the highest public
interest and concern. .

.

.

That the Times was paid for

publishing the advertisement is as immaterial in this connection as is the fact that newspapers and books are sold. 6
The attack on the wall had begun. Speech appearing in a commercial context but not serving a commercial purpose would not necessarily be dealt with under the Valentine doctrine. The public
interest value of the speech, despite its commercial context, determined that it would receive first amendment protection.
The Court further clarified its position concerning commercial
speech in PittsburghPress Co. v. Pittsburgh Commission on Human
Relations.'7 The Court found that the "Help Wanted" advertisements, which were divided into "Male" or "Female" columns, were
"no more than a proposal of possible employment. The advertise14i1. 54.
15376 U.S. 254 (1964).
16 Id. 266.
17 413 U.S. 376 (1973).

19811

FAIR CREDIT REPORTING ACT

ments are thus classic examples of commercial speech." 18 The
Court's ultimate denial of first amendment protection to these advertisements,"9 however, did not result from their commercial
nature. 20 Rather, the decisive element in this case was that the
d
2
advertising assisted illegal employment discrimination.
Subsequent commercial speech cases reiterate this principle: a state may
prohibit advertising of illegal activity without violating the first
22
amendment.
In Bigelow v. Virgina, the Court took another step toward
abandoning the Valentine v. Chrestensen doctrine.
The fact that the particular advertisement in appellant's newspaper had commercial aspects or reflected the
advertiser's commercial interests did not negate all First
Amendment guarantees. The state was not free of all
constitutional restraint merely because the advertisement
involved sales or "solicitations," . . . or because appellant
was paid for printing it, .. . or because appellant's motive

or the motive of the advertiser may have involved financial
again.

2

Moreover, the Court reinterpreted the Valentine ban on handbill
2
distribution as a mere time, place, or manner restriction. 5
The advertisement in Bigelow offered abortion services available in New York. As in New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, the
Court found a public interest component in the advertisement that
prevented its classification as purely commercial speech, 26 allowing
27
it again to postpone deciding the treatment of such speech.
21 Id. 385.
'9

Id. 390-91.

20 Although the Court recognized the possibility that commercial speech may

have inherent value making' it worthy of more protection than "Chrestensen and
its progeny would suggest,

it found that argument "unpersuasive in this case."

Id. 388.
21 Id.

389.

22 See infra text accompanying notes 28, 33 & 38.
23421 U.S. 809 (1975).

24d.818 (citations omitted).
25 Id. 819-20.
26 1d. 822.

27 Regardless of the particular label asserted by the State-whether it
calls speech "commercial" or "commercial advertising" or "solicitation"a court may not escape the task of assessing the First Amendment interest at stake and weighing it against the public interest allegedly served

by the regulation. The diverse motives, means, and messages of advertising may make speech "commercial" in widely varying degrees. We
need not decide here the extent to which constitutional protection is af-
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In 1976, the Court finally confronted the issue whether speech
doing no more than proposing a legal commercial transaction should
enjoy first amendment protection. In Virginia State Board of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 28 the Court de-

clared:
Our question is whether speech which does "no more
than propose a commercial transaction," . . . is so removed
from any "exposition of ideas," . . . and from "'truth,

science, morality, and arts in general, in its diffusion of
liberal sentiments on the administration of Government,'"
...that it lacks all protection. Our answer is that it is
29

not.

Virginia Pharmacy virtually overruled Valentine v. Chrestensen.
The Court's decision rested on the value of commercial speech-in
this situation the advertising of prescription drug prices-to the
individual consumer 3 0 and to society. 31
Moreover, there is another consideration that suggests
that no line between publicly "interesting" or "important" commercial advertising and the opposite kind
could ever be drawn. Advertising, however tasteless and
excessive it sometimes may seem, is nonetheless dissemination of information as to who is producing and selling
what product, for what reason, and at what price. So long
as we preserve a predominantly free enterprise economy,
the allocation of our resources in large measure will be
made through numerous private economic decisions. It
is a matter of public interest that those decisions, in the
aggregate, be intelligent and well informed. To this end,
the free flow of commercial information is indispensable.3 2
The opinion emphasizes the importance of commercial speech in the
consumer's decisionmaking process. Because commercial advertisforded commercial advertising under all circumstances and in the face of
allkinds of regulation.

Id. 826.
28 425 U.S. 748 (1976).

29 Id. 762 (citations omitted).

so Id.763.
31 Id. 764.
The Court here used the expressions "public
32 Id. 765 (citations omitted).
interest" and "publicly interesting" in apparently contradictory ways. The Court

seemed to say that the subject of the advertisement need not be an issue of political

or social impact, as in New York Times Co. v. Sullivan and Bigelow v. Virginia,

in order to benefit from first amendment protection.
itself has a social value in aiding consumer choices.

Commercial advertising
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ing has its own value and serves a social purpose, the first amendment protects it. This protection, however, is not absolute. The
Court recognized a number of exceptions: restrictions on time, place,
and manner; prohibition of false or misleading advertisements;
regulations of the broadcast media, and the prohibition of advertisements of illegal activities.3
Over the next several years, the Court decided a variety of
cases 3 under the doctrines established in Virginia Pharmacy and
earlier cases. In 1979, in Central Hudson Gas & Electric Corp. v.
Public Service Commission,'5 the Court reexamined in their entirety
the doctrines of those cases. The Court again emphasized the value
of commercial speech to consumers and to society,8 6 while continuing to indicate that such speech was not entitled to full first amendment protection.3 7 More importantly, the Court articulated a fourpart test to be applied in future commercial speech cases.
At the outset, we must determine whether the expression
is protected by the First Amendment. For commercial
speech to come within that provision, it at least must concern lawful activity and not be misleading. Next, we ask
whether the asserted governmental interest is substantial.
If both inquiries yield positive answers, we must determine
whether the regulation directly advances the governmental
interest asserted, and whether it is not more extensive
than is necessary to serve that interest. 8
33

Id. 770-73.

84

See, e.g., Friedman v. Rogers, 440 U.S. 1 (1979)

(state may bar use of

trade names by optometrists); Ohralik v. Ohio State Bar Ass'n, 436 U.S. 447
(1978) (lawyers' in-person solicitations may be prohibited); In re Primus, 436
U.S. 412 (1978) (lawyer's public solicitation of litigation in a public interest
setting permissible); Bates v. State Bar, 433 U.S. 350 (1977) (lawyers may advertise).
W447 U.S. 557 (1980). The Public Service Commission's ban on an advertisement that promoted energy use violated Central Hudson's first amendment
rights. Applying a four-part test, see infra text accompanying note 38, the Court
found the ban too restrictive.
36 Id. 562.
37

Id. 563.

38 Id. 566. The Court applied the four-part Central Hudson test in Metromedia, Inc. v. City of San Diego, 101 S. Ct. 2882 (1981), upholding an ordinance
prohibiting outdoor advertising signs to the extent that the ordinance affected
commercial speech. Although the ordinance regulated commercial speech protected by Central Hudson, it directly advanced the substantial governmental goals
of traffic safety and preservation of the city's aesthetic appearance. Id. 2893.
Moreover, the ordinance was not broader than necessary to achieve its purpose.
Id. In contrast, the portion of the ordinance regulating more highly protected
noncommercial speech violated the first amendment. Id. 2985-86.
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The remainder of this Comment will measure the FCRA
against the Central Hudson standard, discussing the following issues:
whether consumer reports regulated by the FCRA constitute commercial speech, whether the FCRA's restrictions on this speech
implicate the first amendment, and whether the interest balancing
required by Central Hudson supports the validity of the FCRA.

1I. ARE

CONSUMER REPORTS PROTECTED COMMERCIAL SPEECH?

The FCRA 39 regulates two types of speech: "consumer reports"
and "investigative consumer reports." Consumer reports concern
"a consumer's credit worthiness, credit standing, credit capacity,
character, general reputation, personal characteristics, or mode of
living"; 40 generally, however, they contain prior financial history.
Investigative reports contain information "on a consumer's character, general reputation, personal characteristics, or mode of living
[that] is obtained through personal interviews with neighbors,
friends, or associates of the consumer ....
,, 41 By their nature,
therefore, investigative reports are more subjective and less easily
verified than consumer reports.
The FCRA limits the purposes for which either type of report
may be prepared. Consumer reporting agencies may furnish reports
to users at a consumer's request; in response to a court order; to
determine the consumer's eligibility for credit, insurance, employment, or government license or benefit, and to those persons who
otherwise have a "legitimate business need" for the information.4
The question whether these reports should be classified as commercial speech has three possible answers. 43 The first is that consumer reports differ significantly from advertising-the type of
speech at issue in nearly all of the Supreme Court's commercial
speech decisions-and should be accorded a lower level of protec3915 U.S.C. §§ 1681-1681t (1976 & Supp. I1
40 15 U.S.C. § 1681a(d) (1976).

1979).

41 15 U.S.C. § 1681a(e) (1976).
The term "investigative consumer report"
refers to a "consumer report or a portion thereof" in which information is obtained
from those sources specified by the statute. Id.
42 15 U.S.C. § 1681b (1976).
48

In Equifax Services, Inc. v. Cohen, 420 A.2d 189 (Me. 1980), cert. denied,
101 S. Ct. 1360 (1981), the court avoided the question whether the reports regulated by the Maine Act were properly classified as commercial speech. It adopted
that classification in the case before it because it considered that framework to
have been "fixed by all of the parties, as well as by the adjudication of the Superior
Court." 420 A.2d at 195. The court expressed no opinion whether such classification was correct. Id.
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tion.44 Second, consumer reports may be entitled to precisely the
level of protection given to commercial speech in Central Hudson
Gas & Electric Corp. v. Public Service Commission.45 Third, consumer reports may be entitled to full first amendment protection.
This Comment examines the Central Hudson opinion, the courts'
treatment of consumer reports, and the policies behind the commercial speech classification to support the conclusion that consumer
reports are commercial speech, entitled to the protection set forth
in Central Hudson.
A. The Language of Central Hudson
Many courts have discussed commercial speech 46 without defining its boundaries clearly. In Central Hudson, the Court set
forth a broad definition of commercial speech: "expression related
solely to the economic interests of the speaker and its audience." 4
Although the Central Hudson definition did not appear in the
Court's most recent commercial speech case, Metromedia, Inc. v.
City of San Diego,4 8 the Court has not repudiated its language in
Central Hudson. It is reasonable, therefore, to begin with the
Central Hudson definition when considering the appropriate level
of first amendment protection for consumer reports.
Consumer reports have attributes falling both inside and outside the Central Hudson definition of commercial speech. Credit
reporting agencies are in the business of preparing consumer and
investigative reports; the speakers' interests in these reports, there44
'
The Attorney General of Maine took this position in Equifax. Brief of
Defendant/Appellant at 10-15, Equifax Services, Inc. v. Cohen, 420 A.2d 189 (Me.
1980), cert. denied, 101 S. Ct 1360 (1981).
4 447 U.S. 557 (1980). See supra notes 35-38 and accompanying text.
46
See supra notes 13-34 and accompanying text.
47447 U.S. at 561. This broad definition drew fire from Justices Stevens and
Brennan, who declared that "it encompasses speech that is entitled to the maximum protection afforded by the First Amendment." Id. 579 (Stevens, J.,
concurring).
Prior to Central Hudson, commentators offered their own definitions of
commercial speech. For the most part these definitions were narrower than the
formulation of the Central Hudson Court. For example, Jackson and Jeffries wrote
that "'[commercial speech' refers to business advertising that does no more than
solicit a commercial transaction or state information relevant thereto." Jackson
& Jeffries, supra note 11, at 1. This definition equates commercial speech with
advertising; thus, consumer reports are not included. Another commentator defined commercial speech as "speech referring to a brand name product or service
that is not itself protected by the first amendment, issued by a speaker with a
financial interest in the sale of the product or service or in the distribution of the
speech." Comment, First Amendment Protection for Commercial Advertising: The
New ConstitutionalDoctrine, 44 U. CHL L. REV. 205, 254 (1976).
48 101 S.Ct 2882 (1981).
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fore, are purely economic. The users' interests are also purely
economic when those users are credit grantors and insurance underwriters. When the population of users is expanded to include all
persons permitted to receive consumer reports, however, the issue
is not so clear-cut. Their interests in the reports may include noneconomic concerns. For example, an employer probably will be
concerned about the character of a prospective employee who may
be representing his or her business. Similarly, a government official
deciding whether to issue a license may wish to consider public
well-being in addition to economic efficiency. If the courts decide
49
to treat these potentially subjective decisions as purely economic,
even investigative consumer reports may fall neatly into the Central
Hudson definition of commercial speech. If such a rationale is not
adopted, however, formalistic application of the Central Hudson
language will be less satisfactory. As illustrated above, a report involving only economic interests when addressed to one user may
serve noneconomic interests when supplied to another.50 These
uncertainties call for an examination of the historical treatment of
consumer reports and the policies relevant to their classification as
a particular type of speech.
B. The Courts' Treatment of Consumer Reports
Prior to the extension of any first amendment protection to
commercial speech, several courts faced the question whether consumer reports should receive the special first amendment protection
from libel actions set forth in New York Times Co. v. Sullivan.51
These courts uniformly categorized consumer reports as commercial
speech, either explicitly or implicitly, and withheld such protec2 The courts did not discuss commercial speech in detail;
tion.U
49
1n Pittsburgh Press Co. v. Pittsburgh Comm'n on Human Relations, 413
U.S. 376, 385 (1973), the Supreme Court classified help wanted advertisements
as "classic examples of commercial speech," perhaps suggesting that the Court
views employment decisions as involving only economic interests. See supra note
18 and accompanying text.
50For example, an investigative report is prepared containing a consumers
financial history and information about his or her character, reputation, and life
style. When submitted to a prospective insurer, this report is commercial speech.
The insurer will use it only to decide whether to issue an insurance policy. When
used by a prospective employer, however, the same report would be more than
commercial speech under the Central Hudson test because the user's concerns
would be broader than "solely economic."
51376 U.S. 254 (1964).
52 See, e.g., Millstone v. O'Hanlon Reports, Inc., 528 F.2d 829 (8th Cir.
1976); Hood v. Dun & Bradstreet Inc., 486 F.2d 25 (5th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 415 U.S. 985 (1974); Oberman v. Dun & Bradstreet, Inc., 460 F.2d 1381
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their uniform treatment of consumer reports, however, supports the
.argument that such reports are appropriately classified as commercial
speech.
A 1971 dissent by Justice Douglas also supports this argument:
The language of the First Amendment does not except
speech directed at private economic decisionmaking. Certainly such speech could not be regarded as less important
than political expression. When immersed in a free flow
of commercial information, private sector decisionmaking
is at least as effective an institution as are our various governments in furthering the social interest in obtaining the
best general allocation of resources....
The financial data circulated by Dun & Bradstreet, Inc.,
are part of the fabric of national commercial communica53
tion.
in Virginia State Board of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer
Council, 4 the majority opinion cited Justice Douglas's dissent,
adopting his free market rationale for the protection of commercial
speech 5, Although the Court did not need to decide the proper
.classification of consumer reports, its approval of Justice Douglas's
reasoning suggests that it might concur in his conclusion that consumer reports are protected commercial speech.
Reliance on the earlier commercial speech cases, which dealt
with advertising, does not necessarily enable one to predict the results of future consumer reporting cases. Moreover, the libel cases
classifying consumer reports as commercial speech may have limited
precedential value because they were decided prior to the Supreme
Court's rethinking of the commercial speech doctrine in Virginia
Pharmacy and Central Hudson. 6
C. Policies Underlying the Commercial Speech Classification
Exploration of the policies underlying the protection of commercial speech is also productive in determining whether consumer
(7th Cir. 1972); Grove v. Dun & Bradstreet, Inc., 438 F.2d 433 (3d Cdr.),
xert. denied, 404 U.S. 898 (1971); Kansas Electric Supply Co., Inc. v. Dun &
Bradstreet, Inc., 448 F.2d 647 (10th Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 405 U.S. 1026 (1972);
Wottham v. Dun & Bradstreet, Inc., 399 F. Supp. 633 (S.D. Tex. 1975), aff'd,
-537 F.2d 1142 (5th Cir. 1976).
5
Dun & Bradstreet, Inc. v. Grove, 404 U.S. 898, 905-06 (1971) (Douglas,
J., dissenting from the denial of certiorari) (footnote and citation omitted).
14425 U.S. 748, 765 (1976).
MId. 765. See supra text accompanying note 32.
56 See supra text accompanying notes 28-38.
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reports merit such protection.5 7 As early as PittsburghPress Co. v.
Pittsburgh Commission on Human Relations,58 the Court intimated
that the informational value of commercial speech might require
first amendment protection.5 9 The Court made this suggestion explicit in Virginia Pharmacy, emphasizing the importance to individuals and to society of knowing prescription drug prices in order
to be able to make informed economic decisions. 60
As to the particular consumer's interest in the free
flow of commercial information, that interest may be as
keen, if not keener by far, than his interest in the day's
most urgent political debate....
Generalizing, society may also have a strong interest
in the free flow of commercial information. Even an individual advertisement, though entirely "commercial,"
may be of general public interest. 61
Consumer reports, therefore, must be measured against these values:
informed decisionmaking 62 and enriched discussion of an issue of
general public interest.
Stores, banks, credit card companies, insurance companies, employers, landlords, and government agencies rely on the information
in consumer credit and investigative reports to make a variety of
individual decisions. In the Senate hearings on the FCRA, a key
witness emphasized the importance of credit to the American economy and of credit reports to the maintenance of the credit system.63
This testimony provides a strong argument, under the Court's
57

For general discussions of commercial speech, see Jackson & Jeffries, supra

note 11; Knapp, Commercial Speech, the Federal Trade Commission and the First
Amendment, 9 MEM. ST. U.L. REv. 1 (1978); Comment, supra note 47.
58413 U.S. 376, 388 (1973).
59 See supra note 20.
10 See supra text accompanying note 32.
61425 U.S. at 763-64.
62 See Jackson & Jeffries, supra note 11, for the thesis that the Supreme Court
was wrong to extend first amendment protections to commercial speech for this
reason.
63

Twenty five years ago consumer credit outstanding was 5.7 billion
dollars. Today it is 110 billion. Through the use of credit the average
American consumer has been able to enjoy some of the comforts of life
as well as the necessities. Credit is crucial for the poor.
The credit reporting agency is a vital link in the operation of this
rapidly growing consumer credit industry. The creditor needs the potential
customer's credit history in order that he can properly assess any risk

which might be involved in extending credit The consumer also benefits
when he can secure credit promptly without undue red tape.
Hearings on S. 823, supra note 1, at l1a (statement of Virginia H. Knauer, Special Assistant to the President for Consumer Affairs).
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rationale in Virginia Pharmacy, for extending first amendment protection to consumer reports.
On the other hand, consumer reports contribute neither to
society's discussion of a public issue 64 nor to its enlightenment
.about the functioning of the economic system.6 5 Consumer reports
instead are limited to small select audiences, usually paying users."
In Equifax Services, Inc. v. Cohen,67 the Attorney General of Maine

argued that consumer reports, which reach only a limited audience,
should be denied the protection given to commercial advertising,
which reaches a larger, more general audience.6 8 In the consumer
report libel cases decided prior to Virginia Pharmacy, the courts
relied on this argument.6 9
6The
Court discussed this rationale in Bigelow v. Virginia, 421 U.S. 809,
.822 (1975). In Millstone v. O'Hanlon Reports, Inc., 528 F.2d 829 (8th Cir.
1976), the court found that "by the test enunciated in Bigelow, consumer credit
reports are not protected speech for which under the First Amendment 'Con"' Id. 833.
gress shall make no law ....
05The Court discussed this rationale in Virginia Pharmacy, 425 U.S. 748
(1976), declaring that free advertising allowed consumers to make informed deocisions and that those decisions in the aggregate provided an appropriate allocation
of resources. "To this end, the free flow of commercial information is indispensable... . And if it is indispensable to the proper allocation of resources in a
free enterprise system, it is also indispensable to the formation of intelligent opinions
as to how that system ought to be regulated or altered." Id. 765 (citations
-omitted). For criticism of this proposition, see Jackson & Jeffries, supra note 11.
16 Prior to the FCRA, availability of access to consumer reports created two
sorts of problems. First, credit bureaus failed to provide adequate safeguards to
ensure that only users with legitimate business reasons could avail themselves of
the information. See Hearings on S.823, supra note 1, at 67-68 (statement of
William F. Wilier). Second, credit bureaus often made it impossible for a consumer to see his or her own file or to gain knowledge of its contents. See Hearings on S. 823, supra note 1, at 84-85 (statement of Professor Alan F. Westin).
167420 A.2d 189 (Me. 1980), cert. denied, 101 S. Ct. 1360 (1981).
8SBrief of Defendant/Appellant at 13-15, Equifax Services, Inc. v. Cohen, 420
A.2d 189 (Me. 1980), cert. denied, 101 S. Ct. 1360 (1981).
09For example, in Grove v. Dun & Bradstreet, 438 F.2d 433 (3d Cir.), cert.
-denied, 404 U.S. 898 (1971), the court relied on the confidentiality of consumer
reports in its decision to deny them first amendment protection. Although the
court found that for first amendment purposes no principled distinction could be
-made "'between radio and television on the one hand and the press on the other,'"
id. 437 (quoting Rosenbloom v. Metromedia, Inc., 415 F.2d 892, 895 (3d Cir.
1969), aff'd, 403 U.S. 29 (1971)), it declared:
We find such a distinction patent, however, between a publication which
disseminates news for public consumption and one which provides specialized information to a selective, finite audience. To be sure, defendant's
publication is not held out for public consumption.
Id. The contract at issue in Grove required the user of the consumer report to
hold its information in "strict confidence." Id. The court seized on this requirement, noting that the reporting agency had not attempted any public dissemination of information. Id. Accord Hood v. Dun & Bradstreet, Inc., 486 F.2d 25,
29 (5th Cir. 1973); Wortham v. Dun & Bradstreet, Inc., 399 F. Supp. 633, 639
n.2 (S.D. Tex. 1975), aff'd, 537 F.2d 1142 (5th Cir. 1976).
These cases, however, concerned the applicability of the malice standard for
libel, see New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964), to consumer
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An argument that makes first amendment protection dependent
on audience size, however, is not persuasive in other contexts. Street
corner soapbox orators or religious zealots seeking converts may
be ignored; this lack of audience does not justify treating their
speech as unworthy of first amendment protection. One theory
underlying the first amendment is that all speech, whether true or
false, wise or foolish, heard or ignored, contributes to the marketplace of ideas from which truth will emerge.7 0 Indeed, the speech
with the smallest audience may be in need of the greatest protection
because it is most subject to majoritarian attack.
In extending first amendment protection to commercial speech,
the Court has recognized the value of that speech to its audience;
that is, its utility. For example, in Virginia Pharmacy, the Court
noted both the value of the speech to a small audience, even a single
individual, 71 and its value to society at large.7 2 Utility, therefore,
exists quite apart from audience size.
A hypothetical example illustrates this point. A producer of
popular records who wishes to advertise the release of a new album
can purchase advertising space in a general interest publication with
a large circulation or in Rolling Stone with a smaller circulation.
Although more people will see the advertisement in the first publication, it will be of only passing interest to most of them; that is, of
low utility. For most readers of Rolling Stone, however, the advertisement will be of great interest. In this example, the speech has
much greater effect and succeeds in its purpose by reaching a smaller
but more receptive audience. The relationship of a consumer report to its audience is analogous. Society in general has little, if any,
interest in the credit history of an individual credit applicant. In
the public forum, the speech is of low utility. To credit grantors,
however, the information is vital for informed decisionmaking.
credit reports. The courts relied on the most recent in the New York Times line
of cases, Rosenbloom v. Metromedia, Inc., 403 U.S. 29 (1971), which stressed a
public interest issue rather than the public official distinction of New York Times.
This line of reasoning was abandoned in Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S.
323 (1974). The courts' discussions in these consumer report libel cases, therefore, in noting that the information was not publicly disseminated, may have meant
only that the speech contained no public interest component; thus, it did not deserve Rosenblooms protection from libel prosecutions.
7'It is the purpose of the First Amendment to preserve an uninhibited
marketplace of ideas in which truth will ultimately prevail .... .
Red Lion
Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367, 390 (1969). See generally First National
Bank v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 766-77 (1978); Thornhill v. Alabama, 310 U.S. 88,
101-02 (1940); Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, 630 (1919) (Holmes, J.,
dissenting).
71425 U.S. at 763.
72 Id. 764.
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Although the audience is limited, the value of the speech is very
high. Such high utility constitutes a strong argument for applying
to consumer reports the same standard of protection afforded other
73
forms of commercial speech.
D. Summary
Consumer reports in some of their incarnations may not fit precisely into the Central Hudson definition of commercial speech;
for the most part, however, they fall within the spirit of the Court's
broad definition.7 4 The treatment given consumer reports in the
libel cases, which uniformly treated those reports as commercial
speech, adds some support to this conclusion. Moreover, the policies
underlying the extension of first amendment protection to commercial advertising suggest that no distinction can be drawn between the
protection afforded advertising and that which should be afforded
consumer reports. The precise form of this protection is discussed
in greater detail in part IV of this Comment.
III.

FAIR CREDIT REPORTING ACr RESTRICTIONS ON

SPEECH

A closer look at the FCRA's restrictions on speech will identify
the provisions that may pose first amendment problems. The statute
imposes three types of requirements: disclosure requirements,7 5
procedures to ensure accuracy,7 6 and limitations on the content of
77
reports and the persons entitled to receive them.
73 This Comment contends that either of the rationales presented in Virginia
Pharmacy, see supra text accompanying notes 61, 71-72, justifies affording first
amendment protection. Both need not be present.
7
4 An alternative to equating consumer reports with other forms of commercial speech is to label them "private commercial speech" less deserving of constitutional protection than public advertising. In Central Hudson, the Court declared that "[the First Amendment's concern for commercial speech is based
on the informational function of advertising." 447 U.S. at 563; see also First
National Bank v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 782 n.18, 783 (noting the "informational
purpose" of the first amendment and its "role in affording the public access to
discussion, debate, and the dissemination of information and ideas"). This concept
of "informational function," however, may involve the edification of a single listener
as well as enlightenment of the general public. In Virginia Pharmacy, the Court
noted that prescription drug advertising served both types of informational functions.
See supra text accompanying note 61. If the Court chooses to consider public
exposure the most significant justification for the protection of commercial speech,
however, it may be willing to create a category of "private" commercial speech that
can be regulated more freely.
75 15 U.S.C. §§ 1681d, 1681g, 1681m (1976).
76 15 U.S.C. §§ 1681e, 1681i, 1681k, 16811 (1976).

'715 U.S.C. §§ 1681b, 1681c (1976 & Supp. III 1979).
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The disclosure provisions require notification to a consumer
when an investigative report has been provided. At the consumer's
request, the user of the report must disclose its "nature and scope." 78
The consumer also may require the credit bureau to disclose the
nature and substance of the information in the consumer's file, most
of the sources of this information, and the names of its recipients.79
When a user relies on a consumer report to deny or to increase the
cost of credit or insurance, or to deny employment, the user must
notify the consumer of the existence and source of the adverse report. 0 These provisions do not abridge speech; rather, they impose
collateral restrictions on its exercise. Of the provisions of the FCRA
implicating first amendment concerns, however, these notice requirements are the least troublesome. In Buckley v. Valeo,s ' the Court
approved the significant public disclosure requirements of the Federal Election Campaign Act s2 in the context of even more highly
protected speech: the political dialogue at the heart of the first
amendment.8 3 The Court upheld these requirements despite their
strong potential for "chilling" the exercise of first amendment rights.
rhe Court has not found "chilling" to be a problem in commercial
speech cases. It considers commercial speech "a hardy breed of expression that is not 'particularly susceptible to being crushed by
overbroad regulation.' "84 The disclosure requirements of the
FCRA, which limit disclosure to the consumer having a strong and
direct interest in learning what has been reported about him or her,
carry little danger of "chilling" the speaker's exercise of first amendment rights and should present no first amendment problems.,,
The procedures requiring accuracy also are not likely to raise
first amendment problems. They provide for the reinvestigation,
78 15 U.S.C. § 1681d (1976).
79 15 U.S.C. § 1681g (1976).

"[S]ources of information acquired solely for

use in preparing an investigative consumer report and actually used for no other
purpose need not be disclosed .... ." I.
Names of recipients using the eport
for employment purposes during two years preceding the request must be disclosed; names of other recipients during six months preceding the request must be

disclosed. Id.
80 15 U.S.C. § 1681m(a)

(1976).

81424 U.S. 1 (1976) (per curiam).
822 U.S.C. §§431-456 (1976 & Supp. IH 1979).
83

See T. EMmSON, THE SYsTEM OF FnxEDom OF EXPRESSION

(1970); A.
(1948).
Central Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 447 U.S. 557,

MEmEIJoHn, FREE SPEECH AND ITS RELATION TO SELF-GOVERNUNT
84

564 n.6 (1980)

(quoting Bates v. State Bar, 433 U.S. 350, 381 (1977)).

See

infra note 95.
85
Arguably, however, the governmental interest in safeguarding the electoral
process involved in Buckley is stronger than the interests protected by the FCRA.
These interests are discussed in detail infra at text accompanying notes 97-153.
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and correction when necessary, of information challenged by consumers. If the dispute cannot be resolved to the consumer's satisfaction, the credit bureau must include the consumer's side of the
story in its reports. At the consumer's request, the bureau must
notify prior users of the corrections.8 6 Public record information
must be kept up to date s1 and adverse information verified ,if used
in later reports. 8 All of these requirements are means of ensuring
that the credit bureau's information will be accurate. The Court
made explicit that false and misleading commercial speech is ex,cluded from first amendment protection in Virginia State Board of
Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, Inc.; 89 it reiterated this principle in CentralHudson Gas & Electric Corp. v. Public
Service Commission.9" Because the FCRA's accuracy provisions
limit only false or misleading speech, they are likely to withstand a
first amendment challenge.
The provisions limiting the information that may be included
in consumer reports and the users to whom such reports may be provided,"1 however, raise serious first amendment issues. Limiting the
615 U.S.C. § 1681i (1976).
8715 U.S.C. § 1681k(2) (1976).
88 15 U.S.C. § 16811 (1976).
89425 U.S. 748, 771 (1976).
90447 U.S. 557, 566 (1980).
9.1.A consumer reporting agency may furnish a consumer report under the
following circumstances and no other:
(1) In response to the order of a court having jurisdiction to issue
such an order.
(2) In accordance with the written instructions of the consumer to
whom it relates.
(3) To a person which it has reason to believe(A) intends to use the information in connection with a credit
transaction involving the consumer on whom the information is to
be furnished and involving the extension of credit to, or review or
collection of an account of, the consumer; or
(B) intends to use the information for employment purposes; or
(C) intends to use the information in connection with the underwriting of insurance involving the consumer; or
(D) intends to use the information in connection with a determination of the consumer's eligibility for a license or other benefit granted by a governmental instrumentality required by law to
consider an applicant's financial responsibility or status; or
(E) otherwise has a legitimate business need for the information in connection with a business transaction involving the consumer.

15 U.S.C. § 1681b (1976).
(a) Except as authorized under subsection (b) of this section, no
consumer reporting agency may make any consumer report containing
any of the following items of information:
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audience that may receive protected speech is a severe restriction that
does not fall within any of the recognized exceptions to first amendment protection of commercial speech. 92 The restriction on content
and audience must be measured against the Central Hudson test.
The FCRA also prohibits inclusion of "obsolete" information
in consumer reports. Obsolete information is defined to include:
bankruptcies older than ten years; suits and judgments older than
the longer of seven years or the statute of limitations; tax liens paid
more than seven years before; records of arrest, indictment, or conviction older than seven years, and any other adverse information
older than seven years.93 These restrictions pose the most serious
affront to first amendment values because they are content-specific
prior restraints. Futhermore, they ban the use of certain kinds of
public record information. 94 Although the doctrine of prior restraint may not be applicable to commercial speech,95 and although
(1)

cases under title 11 or under the Bankruptcy Act that, from

the date of entry of the order for relief or the date of adjudication, as
the case may be, antedate the report by more than 10 years.
(2) Suits and judgments which, from date of entry, antedate the report by more than seven years or until the governing statute of limitations has expired, whichever is the longer period.
(3) Paid tax liens which, from date of payment, antedate the report by more than seven years.
(4) Accounts placed for collection or charged to profit and los&
which antedate the report by more than seven years.
(5) Records of arrest, indictment, or conviction of crime which, from
date of disposition, release, or parole, antedate the report by more than
seven years.
(6) Any other adverse item of information which antedates the report
by more than seven years.
(b) The provisions of subsection (a) of this section are not applicable in the case of any consumer credit report to be used in connection with(1) a credit transaction involving, or which may reasonably be
expected to involve, a principal amount of $50,000 or more;
(2) the underwriting of life insurance involving, or which may
reasonably be expected to involve, a face amount of $50,000 or more;
or
(3) the employment of any individual at an annual salary which
equals, or which may reasonably be expected to equal $20,000, or
more.
15 U.S.C. § 1681c (1976 & Supp. III 1979).
92
See supra note 33 and accompanying text.
93 15 U.S.C. § 1681c (1976 & Supp. M 1979).
94 Cf. Cox Broadcasting Corp. v. Cohn, 420 U.S. 469 (1975) (a state may
not impose sanctions on the accurate publication of a rape victim's name obtained
from judicial records that are open to public inspection).
95 Even if the differences [among types of speech] do not justify the
conclusion that commercial speech is valueless, and thus subject to complete suppression by the State, they nonetheless suggest that a different
degree of protection is necessary to insure that the flow of truthful and
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a content-specific inquiry may be required in order to prevent dissemination of false and misleading information, 6 a total ban on such
a wide variety of information demands a close examination. The
next part of this Comment, which applies the Central Hudson test
to these questionable provisions of the FCRA, will consider in.
detail these apparent affronts to first amendment values.
IV. Central Hudson APriED

In Bigelow v. Virginia,97 the Court emphasized the necessity of
looking beyond labels to determine the appropriate level of first
amendment protection for speech in the commercial realm. "Regardless of the particular label asserted by the State-whether it calls
speech 'commercial' or 'commercial advertising' or 'solicitation'-a
court may not escape the task of assessing the First Amendment
interest at stake and weighing it against the public interest allegedly
served by the regulation." 98 Central Hudson Gas & Electric Corp.
v. Public Service Commission9 9 restates this proposition: "The protection available for particular commercial expression turns on the
nature both of the expression and of the governmental interests.
served by its regulation." 10
The Court thus has determined that first amendment analysis
of commercial speech questions involves a balancing test. The fourpart 'lltest of CentralHudson provides a framework for this process.
The first part of the test maintains the long-standing exclusion of
misleading information or information advertising an illegal transaction from first amendment protection. 02 The second and third parts.
legitimate commercial information is unimpaired. The truth of commercial speech, for example, may be more easily verifiable by its disseminator than, let us say, news reporting or political commentary, in that
ordinarily the advertiser seeks to disseminate information about a specific
product or service that he himself provides and presumably knows more
about than anyone else. Also, commercial speech may be more durable than other kinds. Since advertising is the sine qua non of commercial profits, there is little likelihood of its being chilled by proper
regulation and foregone entirely.
... [These attributes] may . . .make inapplicable the prohibition
against prior restraints.
Virginia Pharmacy, 425 U.S. at 771 n.24.
9
6Central Hudson, 447 U.S. at 563-64 & n.6.
s9421 U.S. 809 (1975).
98 Id. 826.
99 447 U.S. 557 (1980).
100 Id. 563.
101
See supra text accompanying note 38.
10 2 See supra notes 22, 33 & 89 and accompanying text.
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of the test seek to determine whether the governmental interest is
"substantial" and directly advanced by the regulation in question. 1 3
The fourth part of the test requires a determination whether the
regulation is more restrictive than necessary to serve the governmental interest. The remainder of this part of the Comment will
apply the Central Hudson test to the two problematic sections of
the FCRA: the limitation on parties who may receive credit information 104 and the prohibition on the use of dated information in
,credit reports.10 5
A. "For commercial speech to come within [the shelter of first
amendment protection] it at least must concern lawful activity and
not be misleading." 106

Consumer credit and investigative reports do not propose illegal
transactions; 107 thus, they satisfy the "lawful activity" requirement
of this part of the Central Hudson test. The limitation on parties
who may receive credit information also bears no relationship to
103 The level of protection afforded commercial speech has been set forth only
in terms of a balancing test. The protection is related to the nature or value of
the speech and can be outweighed by an interest that must be at least "substantial."
The precise meaning of a "substantial" interest is not defined, either in
Central Hudson or in the cases applying the Central Hudson standard. In Record
Revolution No. 6, Inc. v. City of Parma, 638 F.2d 916 (6th Cir. 1980), vacated
,and remanded, 101 S. Ct. 2998 (1981), the court summarily assumed that the
interest was substantial and that the regulation in question directly advanced that
interest. "The regulatory interest of Parma, Lakewood and North Olmstead in
stopping drug abuse is plainly substantial. Also, the broad regulation would seem
to advance this interest directly, though its effectiveness may be questioned." Id.
936.
The New York Court of Appeals applied the same kind of summary analysis in
Kofler v. Joint Bar Ass'n, 51 N.Y.2d 140, 412 N.E.2d 927, 432 N.Y.S.2d 872
(1980), cert. denied, 101 S. Ct. 1733 (1981). The court perhaps found more
extensive analysis unnecessary because it knew that the challenged regulations
would fail the fourth part of the Central Hudson test.
104

See supra note 91.

105 See supra note 91.
106 447 U.S. at 566.
107 Legislation other than credit reporting legislation may make illegal the use

Of certain types of information for specified purposes. In Equifax Services, Inc.
v. Cohen, 420 A.2d 189 (Me. 1980), cert. denied, 101 S. Ct. 1360 (1981), the
court noted that "the Maine Human Rights Act prohibits discrimination based
solely upon age, sex, race, religion, color, physical or mental handicap, ancestry,
or national origin in the specific areas of credit extension, employment, housing and
public accommodations." 420 A.2d at 203. The Attorney General argued that
the Maine Act's provisions prohibiting inclusion of the same information in credit
reports were directed toward commercial speech that "relates to illegal activity"
and is not entitled to first amendment protection. Brief of Defendant/Appellant
at 25-27, Equifax Services, Inc. v. Cohen, 420 A.2d 189 (Me. 1980), cert. denied,
101 S. Ct. 1360 (1981). The court rejected this argument, refusing to presume
that recipients of consumer reports would use information illegally simply be,cause they had access to it. 420 A.2d at 205.
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either part of this test. Dated information in consumer reports,
however, conceivably could mislead potential credit grantors. The
Maine court failed to find adequate support for the presumption
that dated information was "more likely to deceive the public than
to inform it" 108 in the legislative history of the FCRA. 1°9
Two hypothetical situations illustrate the tensions underlying
section 1681c, the provision prohibiting use of dated information.
First, assume that eleven years ago Mr. Jones was adjudged a bankrupt, the result of unwise and immature decisions. Today he is
financially prudent. Second, assume that eight years ago Mr. Smith
was convicted of child molesting while employed as a school bus
driver.110 Today, a school personnel officer is considering hiring
him as a bus driver.
These two hypothetical situations provoke different kinds of
concerns. In Jones's case, the policy of granting a bankrupt a fresh
start, combined with the passage of time, make reliance on this dated
information more likely tomislead than to inform a potential credit
grantor, and the information should be deleted. In Smith's case,
it seems more desirable for the decisionmaker to be able to weigh
all relevant information.
Congress had to grapple with these conflicting concerns in considering the FCRA.'1 '
Creditors obviously have a right to know if a person has
had trouble in paying his bills. At the same time it is unfair to burden a consumer for life with a bad credit record
if he has improved his performance. The Associated Credit
Bureaus has [sic] recognized this problem and had proposed
voluntary guidelines to its members to the effect that ad108 Central Hudson, 447 U.S. at 563.
1O9 Equifax Services, Inc. v. Cohen, 420 A.2d 189, 206 (Me. 1980), cert.
denied, 101 S. Ct. 1360 (1981).
In Friedman v. Rogers, 440 U.S. 1 (1979), the Court found the use of trade
names by optometrists to be misleading. To support this finding, the Court relied
heavily on the legislative history of a Texas statute prohibiting the use of such
names. Id. 13-14. In Ohralik v. Ohio State Bar Ass'n, 436 U.S. 447 (1978),
a Federal Trade Commission report concerning the abuses of direct selling provided
partial support for the Court's decision that in-person solicitations by lawyers were
likely to foster misrepresentations. Id. 464. Apparently the Court considers legis:
lative findings significant in determining whether advertising is misleading.
11o This hypothetical situation was suggested by William Folkes, attorney for
Equifax Services, Inc., Atlanta, Georgia, during a telephone interview in February,
1981.
Conviction records less than seven years old may be included in investigative
reports. 15 U.S.C. § 1681c(a)(5) (1976).
IISection 1681c represents Congress's effort to balance these conflicting
values. See supra note 91 for the text of this provision. If a credit transaction,
life insurance policy value, or potential salary exceed specified dollar amounts,
credit reports need not exclude "obsolete" information. 15 U.S.C. § 1681c(b)
(1976).
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verse information not be reported if it is older than 7 years
12
or 14 years in the case of bankruptcies..
The credit industry itself recognized the difficulties in balancing
these two conflicting concerns and suggested the original sevenand fourteen-year limitations on the use of dated information. "The
industry has voluntarily cooperated with the committee in developing sound and workable legislation which accomplishes the objectives without imposing unduly restrictive requirements on the
industry." .13 This suggestion and the industry's attempt at selfregulation may indicate that the credit industry itself believes that
dated information is "misleading."
Congress was concerned primarily about the "relevance" ".4 of
dated information. Although a correlation between information
that is irrelevant and information that is misleading may exist, it is
not clear that Congress's concern in banning dated information
stemmed primarily from a belief that dated information is presumptively misleading. 15 Because neither the examples nor the
legislative history clearly support the proposition that dated information in consumer reports is "more likely to deceive ... than to
inform," "'6 exclusion of this information from all first amendment
7
protection seems inappropriate."1
B. "Next, we ask whether the asserted governmental interest is
.substantial .

.

. [and] whether the regulation directly advances the

,, 118
governmental interest asserted ....
The Senate Subcommittee on Financial Institutions devoted
five days of hearings and 562 pages of testimony to demonstrating
the need for the FCRA and explaining its purpose."19 The first
REc. 33,410 (1969) (remarks of Senator Proxmire).
113 Id. The credit industry undertook this balancing of interests before first
112 115 CoNG.

amendment protection had been extended to commercial speech.
11- Senator Proxmire, in presenting the FCRA to the Senate, characterized it
-as a response to three recurring complaints about consumer reports: their lack of
accuracy, relevance, and confidentiality. Senator Proxmire considered the restriction on the use of dated information a response to the problem of irrelevance.

See 115 CoNG. REc. 2414-15 (1969).
115 One item of testimony at the Senate hearings on the FCRA, however, indicated that obsolete information is inherently misleading, painting an inaccurate
picture of a person whose financial habits have changed. See Hearings on S. 823,
supra note 1, at 110 (statement of Wendell G. Lindsay, Jr., on behalf of Louisiana
Consumers' League).
116 Central Hudson, 447 U.S. at 563.
117Cf. Friedman v. Rogers, 440 U.S. 1, 13-15 (1979)
(noting the Texas
legislature's specific finding that optometrists' use of tradenames was inherently

misleading and accepting this finding).
118 447 U.S. at 566.
119 See Hearings on S. 823, supra note 1.
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section of the FCRA sets forth the congressional findings and the
purposes of the legislation.120 Like much of the testimony before
the committee, this section emphasizes the need to guarantee accuracy, privacy, and relevance. The issue whether these interests are
sufficiently substantial to sustain a regulation that prohibits the use
of one kind of information or that limits the parties who may receive
consumer reports, therefore, must be addressed.
Section 1681c's prohibition primarily reaches dated public
record information that is presumptively accurate. Prohibiting the
use of this information, therefore, does not advance the governmental interest in accuracy. Also embraced by the prohibition,
however, is "any other adverse item of information" more than seven
years old.' 2 ' Prohibiting use of this kind of information does advance the accuracy interest. Dated information not supported by a
public document will be more difficult to verify and to update and
therefore more difficult for the credit applicant to refute successfully.
Accuracy, however, is not the only value the FCRA seeks to
protect. Hearings before the Senate subcommittee emphasized
another governmental interest: privacy. The testimony reprinted
a Georgetown Law Journal Note discussing the concept of privacy
as applied to consumer reports.
The right to privacy has been defined as a legal concept of the power of an individual to determine the extent
to which another individual or group may obtain his ideas,
writings, or other indicia of his personality; obtain or re(a) The Congress makes the following findings:
(1) The banking system is dependent upon fair and accurate credit
reporting. Inaccurate credit reports directly impair the efficiency of the
banking system, and unfair credit reporting methods undermine the public
confidence which is essential to the continued functioning of the banking
system.
(2) An elaborate mechanism has been developed for investigating
and evaluating the credit worthiness, credit standing, credit capacity,
character, and general reputation of consumers.
(3) Consumer reporting agencies have assumed a vital role in assembling and evaluating consumer credit and other information on consumers.
(4) There is a need to insure that consumer reporting agencies exercise their grave responsibilities with fairness, impartiality, and a respect for
the consumer's right to privacy.
(b) It is the purpose of this subchapter to require that consumer reporting agencies adopt reasonable procedures for meeting the needs of
commerce for consumer credit, personnel, insurance, and other information
in a manner which is fair and equitable to the consumer, with regard to
the confidentiality, accuracy, relevancy, and proper utilization of such information in accordance with the requirements of this subchapter.
15 U.S.C. § 1681 (1976).
12115 U.S.C. § 1681c(6) (1976).
120
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veal information about him; and intrude into his life space.
Inherent in this definition are two significant problems,
both of which arise in a credit investigation context. One
is the release of information to persons who have no legitimate business interest in it; the other is the collection of
information of a highly personal nature. These problems
have no relation to the truth or falsity of a report, but are
intimately tied to the concept of a right to privacy.122
An essential ingredient of privacy is the ability to control information about oneself. Another article cited in the hearings M
emphasized this control: Privacy is not simply an absence of information about us in the minds of others; rather it is the control we
have over information about ourselves. 12
The FCRA attempts to balance the consumer's interest and the
massive credit reporting industry's interest; it helps the individual
consumer to control the recipients of information and the portion of
"Whenever a private
his or her life that may be scrutinized. 12
organization is able to exercise substantial power over an individual,
public regulation has generally followed to insure that the power is
exercised fairly." 120
The FCRA represents Congress's determination of the appropriate balance between the credit industry's need for information
12 7
and the individual's right to privacy.
A creditor does not have an absolute right to obtain details
on any and all aspects of a person's private life merely because he has applied for credit, even if the creditor can
demonstrate some vague and tenuous relationship between
the information and the decision as to whether or not to
grant credit. At some point the individual's right to
privacy takes precedent [sic] over the creditor's right to
obtain information.128
122 Note, Credit Investigations and the Right to Privacy: Quest for a Remedy,
57 GEo. LJ. 509 (1969), quoted in Hearings on S. 823, supra note 1, at 456,
470 (footnotes omitted).
123 Hearings on S. 823, supra note 1, at 38-39 (statement of John Caemmerer,
citing Fried, Privacy, 77 YALx L.J. 475, 482 (1968)).
124 Fried, supra note 123, at 482 (emphasis in original).
125 STAN. Note, supra note 3, at 556.
126 Hearings on S. 823, supra note 1, at 2 (statement of Senator Proxmire).
12 7

But see Comment, The Fair Credit Reporting Act Amendments: Enforce-

ment of the Legislative Trust?, 45 Miss. L.J. 95, 107-08 (1974) (arguing that the
many changes made in the original bill as it traveled through Congress resulted in
legislation that failed to reflect the purposes of either the House or the Senate).
128 115 CoNG. RE . 2413 (1969)

(remarks of Senator Proxmire).
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The Supreme Court, in a variety of contexts, also has addressed
the issue of individuals' rights to privacy. For example, an individual's privacy interest in procreation decisions I" is of a constitutional dimension, as is the fourth amendment '10 guarantee against
physical invasions of privacy by instrumentalities of the state. The
sanctity of an individual's home is also a privacy interest of "the highest order." 131 In Ohralik v. Ohio State Bar Association, the Court
held that the state had a sufficient interest in the protection of a
more amorphous concept of privacy to support a ban on lawyers'
32
in-person solicitations of clients.
In Whalen v. Roe, 133 the Court considered a threat to informational privacy of the type the FCRA protects. That case dealt with
New York's computerized file of the names and addresses of all recipients of specified prescription drugs. Although the Court upheld
the system because it provided adequate safeguards, the Justices
revealed great sensitivity to the privacy interests involved.'3
The high level of constitutional protection accorded an individual's privacy interest provides a persuasive argument that the
privacy interest the FCRA seeks to protect is substantial. The issue
that must be addressed, therefore, is whether the constitutionally
suspect sections of the FCRA directly advance that interest.
Limiting access to consumer credit information to those with
commercially justifiable needs is directly related to protecting the
12Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973); Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438
(1972); Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
130Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967).
131 Carey v. Brown, 447 U.S. 455, 471 (1980).
132436 U.S. 447, 465-66 (1978).
's3429 U.S. 589 (1977).
134 We are not unaware of the threat to privacy implicit in the accumulation of vast amounts of personal information in computerized data banks
or other massive government files. . . . Recognizing that in some circumstances that duty [to avoid unwarranted disclosures] arguably has its
roots in the Constitution, nevertheless New York's statutory scheme . . .
evidencets] a proper concern with, and protection of, the individual's interest in privacy. We therefore need not, and do not, decide any question which might be presented by the unwarranted disclosure of accumulated private data-whether intentional or unintentional-or by a system
that did not contain comparable security provisions.
Id. 605-06 (footnote omitted). Other courts have expressed similar concerns for informational privacy. See, e.g., Duplantier v. United States, 606 F.2d 654, 669 (5th
Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 101 S. Ct. 854 (1981); Plante v. Conzalez, 575 F.2d 1119,
1133-35 (5th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 1129 (1979).
Adequate protection of computer-stored information, however, is becoming in-creasingly difficult to ensure. See The Spreading Danger of Computer Crime,
Busm-ss W=zz, April 20, 1981, at 86, 88 (noting a "credit-profile improvement
service" that gained access to the files of a subsidiary of Equifax, Inc.). This
growing awareness of an increasing problem may make the Court less willing to
tely on business assurances to protect the privacy interest.
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consumer's privacy interest. The Senate hearings reveal the committee's sensitivity to the privacy issue:
The central issue of privacy is the release of personal
credit information to other than credit grantors. ... [T]here
has been overwhelming evidence that credit files on individuals can be obtained by non-credit grantors with great
ease. Police agencies and federal investigators, for example, have access to most credit bureaus.-1
The relationship between the prohibition on use of dated information and the individual consumer's privacy interest, however,
is not so readily apparent. One argument advanced by proponents
of the prohibition is that excluding dated information limits the
period of the individual's life that credit reports can examine, thereby increasing the individual's control. 3 6 This argument has merit.
The period that remains open to scrutiny, however, is so long that
the seven- or ten-year limitations become almost meaningless. Seven
years (or longer if larger dollar amounts or a bankruptcy is involved) 137 is a long period of an individual's life to be open to
scrutiny. Credit information agencies may collect, maintain, and
report virtually any information concerning this portion of a credit
applicant's life. Permitting credit investigators this much freedom
makes the concept of consumer control illusory.
Limiting use of dated information seems more closely related
to the goal that only relevant information be considered when credit
grantors make credit decisions. 138 The relationship between this
restriction and the concern for relevance, however, is similarly
weak. Moreover, the FCRA contains no other limitations that
advance the interest in relevance. Such ineffective legislation may
fail the Central Hudson test: "[T]he restriction must directly advance the state interest involved; the regulation may not be sustained if it provides only ineffective or remote support for the
government's purpose." 189 The prohibition on the use of dated information probably would fail this part of the Central Hudson test
because it fails to promote effectively either the privacy or the
relevancy interest.
135 Hearings on S. 823, supra note 1, at 92 (statement of Professor Alan F.

Westin).
138 See supra note 125 and accompanying text.

13715 U.S.C. § 1681c (1976 & Supp. I1 1979). See supra note 111.
138 The interest in relevance may be contained within the privacy interest.
189 447 U.S. at 564.

For discussion of the FCRA's failures, see Note, Fair

Credit Reporting Act: The Case for Revision, 10 Loy. L.A.L. REv. 409 (1977);
YALE Note, supra note 3.
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C. Is the regulation "more extensive than is necessary to serve
[the governmental] interest"? 140
The final part of the Central Hudson test requires that less restrictive alternatives be considered. During the Senate hearings,
the concern that consumer credit reports traditionally have been
made available to those with no legitimate business need-for example, the police, the Federal Bureau of Investigation, labor unions,
lawyers checking on prospective jurors, and those investigating prospective husbands and sons-in-law-was identified and documented.14 '
The FCRA defines several permissible purposes for which credit
reports may be issued. The final phrase of this section of the statute
permits a credit agency to issue a report to a person it believes "has
a legitimate business need for the information in connection with
a business transaction involving the consumer." 142 This language
in effect constitutes a grant of access so broad as to render the provision almost meaningless. A less restrictive alternative that would
correct the problem, however, is difficult to construct.
The restriction on the use of dated information is also minimally restrictive.143 Allowing longer time periods to remain open
to credit investigators' scrutiny would be even less restrictive;
it also, however, would further weaken a regulation already only
marginally effective. 44 One problem concerning the prohibition
on dated information remains to be discussed. Most of the data
covered by the time limitations in section 1681c is public record
information. 45 In Cox Broadcasting Corp. v. Cohn,'46 the Court
addressed another question concerning public record information,
holding that the state could not impose sanctions for invasion of
140 447 U.S. at 566.
On its face, this test may appear to conflict with a
"least restrictive alternative" test. Application of the test, however, requires that
less restrictive alternatives be considered. The Court seems to say that if speech
is to be restricted, the restriction must accomplish a goal that justifies imposing a
limit on first amendment protection. The Court has set forth the boundaries within
which permissible regulation must fall. At one end, the regulation must directly
and effectively advance a substantial governmental interest. At the other end, the
regulation must not restrict speech more than is necessary to accomplish this
purpose.
141 See supra note 135 and accompanying text.
142 15 U.S.C. § 1681b (1976).

See supra text accompanying notes 136-37.
Because the credit industry suggested these time periods, it may be assumed that they are not overly restrictive. See supra text accompanying note 113.
'45 15 U.S.C. §! 681c (1976 & Supp. III 1979).
See supra text accompanying notes 93-94.
'146 420 U.S. 469 (1975).
'43
4 4

'
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privacy against a television station for broadcasting a deceased rape
victim's name that had already appeared in the public record.
By placing the information in the public domain on
official court records, the State must be presumed to have
concluded that the public interest was thereby being served.
Public records by their very nature are of interest to those
concerned with the administration of government, and a
public benefit is performed by the reporting of the true
contents of the records by the media. The freedom of the
press to publish that information appears to us to be of
critical importance to our type of government in which
the citizenry is the final judge of the proper conduct of
public business. In preserving that form of government
the First and Fourteenth Amendments command nothing
less than that the States may not impose sanctions on the
in official
publication of truthful information contained
47
court records open to public inspection.
This language could be read broadly to prohibit regulation of public
record information in all forms of expression, including consumer
reports. The situation in Cox, however, is distinguishable from one
involving public record information in credit reports. First, the
Court in Cox emphasized the special role of the press in reporting
judicial proceedings. 4 8 Second, the defendant in Cox was a television station providing news coverage, thus serving the public interest. 149 Third, the trial during which the victim's name was revealed was current and newsworthy. Fourth, the newspaper's speech
was not commercial speech. 5 0 None of these elements exist when
reporting agencies release public record information to potential
credit grantors. Because the Court in Cox stressed the role of the
media in monitoring the administration of justice,151 and because
commercial speech is entitled to less protection than other speech,
147 Id.
14

495.

8 The"Court said that "tihe commission of crime, prosecutions resulting from

it, and judicial proceedings arising from" the prosecutions ... are without question
events of legitimate concern to the public and consequently fall within the responsibility of the press to report the operations of government." Id. 492.
149 Id. 495.
150 In Anonymous v. Dun & Bradstreet, Inc., 3 Media L. Rep. 2376 (N.D.
IM. 1978), aff'd mem., 594 F.2d 867 (7th Cir. 1979), the court relied on Cox to
hold that the publication of a 20-year-old criminal conviction in a consumer report did not constitute an invasion of privacy. The court, however, incorrectly
characterized the credit bureau as a member of the press.
15 1 Consumer reporting agencies, which report public record information for
purely private commercial ends, are hardly likely to be seen as playing a similarly
crucial role in serving the public interest.
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the Cox rationale may not apply to the publication of consumer
reports. The Court's emphasis in Cox on the information's availability in the public domain, however, suggests that it might not
make this distinction. Section 1681c's restrictions on reporting
dated information, therefore, might be declared unconstitutional
because they prohibit dissemination of information that the state
already has made available to the public.
Even if the Cox rationale is not applied in the credit reporting
context, the FCRA's effectiveness in advancing the privacy interest
is weakened nonetheless, because the restricted information is largely
public record information. After all, a prospective creditor and
a credit reporting agency are both free to research a consumer's
history in the public record. The availability of information, however, is diminished by the prohibitive expenses that a single credit
grantor, insurance company, or employer would incur in assembling
the same information that a credit bureau is in the business of providing. In this practical sense, the protection the statute provides is
real.
The invalidation of section 1681c undoubtedly would weaken
the FCRA. Strict enforcement of the remaining provisions, particularly those requiring that public record information be kept up to
date and those allowing consumers to challenge and to require verification of information, 152 might help to offset the effect of such an
invalidation. Some commentators, however, have suggested that
stricter enforcement would not be accomplished easily. 153
V.

CONCLUSION

The FCRA's limitation on those who may receive consumer reports, although called into question by the Supreme Court's recent
treatment of commercial speech, probably will withstand a first
amendment challenge. This restriction directly and effectively advances the government's interest in protecting privacy. The prohibition on the inclusion of dated nonpublic record information also
15215 U.S.C. §§ 1681i, 1681k (1976).
153 See, e.g., Note, Fair Credit Reporting Act, 13 SmTorx L. REv. 63 (1979)
(finding enforcement problems stemming from the tendency of courts and the

Federal Trade Commission to construe the FCRA narrowly); see also Note, supra
note 139 (contending

that the portion of the FCRA pertaining to investigative

reports is substantively inadequate to give consumers sufficient protection). This
latter Note recommends amendments providing for better consumer notification and
access to information to allow the consumer to check and correct his or her file

prior to its release to a credit grantor. The Note also recommends substantive
limits on the information that may be included in such reports. Such a revision,
however, would raise additional first amendment problems.
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should survive constitutional scrutiny because it advances the government's interest in ensuring accuracy in reports. The prohibition
on the use of dated public record information, on the other hand,
faces a more uncertain future. Although this prohibition arguably
serves the government's interest in protecting privacy by eliminating
irrelevant information, it is addressed to public record information
and therefore is more likely to encounter an insurmountable constitutional barrier.

